Abstract-We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization, and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents' uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty eventually accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing that inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned raises uncertainty. However, these announcements lower policy uncertainty and curb inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the United States, enhancing transparency raises welfare.
I. Introduction
T HE past two decades have witnessed two major breakthroughs in the practice of central banking worldwide. First, most central banks have adopted a monetary policy framework that Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) have termed constrained discretion. Bernanke (2003) explains that under constrained discretion, the central bank retains some flexibility in deemphasizing inflation stabilization so as to pursue alternative short-run objectives such as unemployment stabilization. However, such flexibility is constrained to the extent that the central bank should maintain a strong reputation for keeping inflation and inflation expectations firmly under control. Second, many countries have taken remarkable steps to make their central bank more transparent (Bernanke et al., 1999; Mishkin, 2002; Campbell et al., 2012) .
As a result of these changes, the following questions are crucial for modern monetary policymaking. First, for how long can a central bank deemphasize inflation stabilization before the private sector starts fearing a return to a period of high and volatile inflation as in the 1970s? Second, does transparency play an essential role for effective monetary policymaking? Should a central bank be explicit about the future course of monetary policy? The recent financial crisis has triggered a prolonged period of accommodative monetary policy that some members of the Federal Open Market Committee fear could lead to a disanchoring of inflation expectations (as an example, see Plosser, 2012) . Thus, these questions are at the center of the current policy debate.
To address these questions, we develop and estimate a model in which the anti-inflationary stance of the central bank can change over time and agents face uncertainty about the nature of deviations from active inflation stabilization. When monetary policy alternates between prolonged periods of active inflation stabilization (active regime) and short periods during which the emphasis on inflation stabilization is reduced (short-lasting passive regime), the model captures the monetary approach described as constrained discretion. However, the central bank can also engage in prolonged deviations from the active regime of the type observed in the 1970s (long-lasting passive regime). Agents in the model are fully rational and able to infer if monetary policy is active. However, when the passive rule prevails, they are uncertain about whether the central bank is engaging in a short-lasting or a long-lasting deviation from the active regime. The central bank can then follow two possible communication strategies: transparency or no transparency. Under no transparency, the nature of the deviation is not revealed. Under transparency, the duration of short-lasting deviations is announced.
Under no transparency, when passive monetary policy prevails, agents' conduct Bayesian learning in order to infer the likely duration of the deviation from active monetary policy. Given that the behavior of the monetary authority is unchanged across the two passive regimes, the only way for rational agents to learn about the nature of the deviation consists of keeping track of the number of consecutive deviations. As agents observe more and more realizations of the passive rule, they become increasingly convinced that the long-lasting passive regime is occurring. As a result, the more the central bank deviates from active inflation stabilization, the more agents become discouraged about a quick return to the active regime. We solve the model by keeping track of the joint evolution of policymakers' behavior and agents' beliefs, using the methods developed in Bianchi and Melosi (2016) .
In the model, social welfare is shown to be a function of agents' uncertainty about future inflation and future output gaps. In standard models, monetary policy affects agents' welfare by influencing the unconditional variances of the endogenous variables. In our nonlinear setting, policy actions exert dynamic effects on uncertainty. Therefore, welfare evolves over time in response to the short-run fluctuations of uncertainty. To our knowledge, this feature is new in the literature and allows us to study changes in the macroeconomic risk due to policy actions and communication strategies and the associated welfare implications.
We measure uncertainty taking into account agents' beliefs about the evolution of monetary policy. As long as the number of deviations from the active regime is low, the increase in uncertainty is very modest and stays in line with the levels implied by the active regime. This is because agents regard the early deviations as temporary. However, as the number of deviations increases and fairly optimistic agents become fairly pessimistic about a quick return to active policies, uncertainty starts increasing and eventually converges to the values implied by the long-lasting passive regime. As a result, for each horizon, our measure of uncertainty is now higher than its long-run value. This is because agents take into account that while in the short run a prolonged period of passive monetary policy will prevail, in the long run, the economy will surely visit the active regime again. Therefore, an important result arises: deviations from the active regime that last only a few periods have no disruptive consequences on welfare because they do not have a large impact on agents' uncertainty regarding future monetary policy. Instead, if a central bank deviates from the active regime for a prolonged period of time, the disanchoring of agents' uncertainty occurs, causing sizable welfare losses.
The model under the assumption of no transparency is fitted to U.S. data. We identify prolonged deviations from active monetary policy in the 1960s and the 1970s in line with previous contributions to the literature. However, we also find that the Federal Reserve has recurrently engaged in short-lasting passive policies since the early 1980s, supporting the view that constrained discretion has been the predominant approach to U.S. monetary policy in the past three decades. In the analysis, we abstract from the reasons why the Federal Reserve has engaged in such deviations. In fact, we consider these recurrent deviations as a given of our analysis. This approach provides us with a parsimonious, reduced-form framework to estimate the Federal Reserve's behaviors in the data. Given these estimated behaviors, we evaluate how quickly agents' beliefs respond to policymakers' behaviors and announcements, what this implies for the evolution of uncertainty and welfare, and what the potential gains are from reducing the uncertainty about the future conduct of monetary policy.
The paper introduces a practical definition of reputation: a central bank has a strong reputation if it is less likely to engage in long-lasting deviations from active policies. We find it useful to distinguish two related concepts: longrun reputation and short-run reputation. Long-run reputation depends on how frequently the central bank has historically deviated from active policies and for how long. This measure of reputation maps into the estimated transition matrix, which controls the unconditional probability of observing long spans of passive monetary policy and deeply affects the unconditional level of uncertainty in the macroeconomy. Short-run reputation captures agents' beliefs about the conduct of monetary policy in the near future. This second measure of reputation corresponds to a precise statistic: the expected number of consecutive deviations from active monetary policy. To avoid having to constantly distinguish between the two measures of reputation, this last statistic is dubbed pessimism, as it captures how pessimistic agents are about observing a switch to active policy. We often use the term reputation to refer to long-run reputation.
While our definition of reputation is not exactly the one used in theory studies (Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Barro & Gordon, 1983) , it well suits Bernanke's definition of constrained discretion and has the important advantage of being measurable in the data. Bernanke (2003) explains that for constrained discretion to work effectively, the central bank has to "establish a strong commitment to keeping inflation low and stable." In our paper, the strength of this commitment is called long-run reputation. If the Federal Reserve engages in prolonged periods of passive policies, agents become more pessimistic about a return to the active regime. As pessimism increases, so do inflation volatility and uncertainty. In Bernanke's parlance, the Federal Reserve's "discretion" can become "constrained" in that short-run reputation deteriorates after a prolonged deviation from active policy.
The fact that the Federal Reserve conducted a prolonged spell of passive policy in the 1970s has contributed to lowering its reputation in our estimated model. Nevertheless, although the Federal Reserve's reputation is not immaculate, that is found to benefit from its strong reputation. Based on the estimates, pessimism and, hence, agents' uncertainty about future inflation change vary sluggishly in response to deviations from active monetary policy. This finding has the important implication that the Federal Reserve can conduct passive policies for a fairly large number of years before the disanchoring of inflation expectations and an overall increase in macroeconomic uncertainty occur. However, very prolonged deviations from active policy lead agents to become wary that the central bank has switched to 1970s types of policies, causing detrimental effects on welfare.
While this result implies that the Federal Reserve can successfully implement constrained discretion even without transparency, our findings suggest that increasing transparency would improve welfare. The estimated model suggests that the welfare gains from transparency range between 0.54% and 3.74% of steady-state consumption. A transparent central bank systematically announces the duration of any short-lasting deviation from the active regime beforehand, whereas in the case of a long-lasting deviation, the exact duration is not known. The implications of such a communication strategy vary based on the nature of the deviation. When the central bank engages in a short-lasting deviation, announcing its duration immediately removes the fear of the 1970s. Under no transparency, instead, agents are not informed about the exact nature of the observed deviation. As a result, whenever a short deviation occurs, ex ante agents cannot rule out the possibility of a long-lasting deviation of the kind that characterized the 1970s. As a result, ex post, agents turn out to have overstated the persistence of the observed deviation. How large this effect is depends on the central bank's reputation.
The model allows us to highlight an important trade-off associated with transparency. First, in the short run, being transparent reduces welfare because agents are told that passive monetary policy will prevail for a while and thereby future shocks are expected to have larger effects. Second, as time goes by, agents know that the prolonged period of passive monetary policy is coming to an end. This leads to a reduction in the level of uncertainty at every horizon with an associated improvement in welfare. Notice that this is exactly the opposite of what occurs when no announcement is made: Agents, in the case of no transparency, become more and more discouraged about the possibility of moving to the active regime, and uncertainty increases. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies this critical trade-off associated with the central bank's announcements through the lens of an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Furthermore, our results are robust to relaxing the assumption that the central bank never lies about the duration of passive monetary policy.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we show how to model recurrent policymakers' announcements about the central bank's future reaction function in an estimated DSGE model. 1 Second, we show how to characterize and compute social welfare in a Markov-switching DSGE model with Bayesian learning and announcements. Interestingly, in our nonlinear framework, welfare captures the macroeconomic risk perceived by the agents as a function of the expected or announced policy decisions. Finally, we estimate a microfounded general equilibrium model with changes in policymakers' behavior and Bayesian learning. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates a DSGE model with Markov-switching structural parameters and Bayesian learning. Our learning mechanism implies that agents' beliefs are not invariant to the duration of a certain policy. Therefore, the model captures a very intuitive idea: agents in the late 1970s were arguably more pessimistic about a quick return to the active regime than they had been in the early 1970s. This feature was not present in previous contributions such as Bianchi (2013) and Davig and Doh (2014) . This paper is part of a broader research agenda that aims to model the evolution of agents' beliefs in general equilibrium models (Bianchi & Melosi, 2014 , 2016 . Our modeling framework goes beyond the assumption of anticipated utility that is often used in the learning literature. 2 Such an assumption implies that agents forecast future events assuming that their beliefs will never change in the future. Instead, agents in our models know that they do not know. Therefore, when forming expectations, they take into account that their beliefs will evolve according to what they will observe in the future. Schorfheide (2005) considers an economy in which agents use Bayesian learning to infer changes in a Markovswitching inflation target. In that paper, agents solve a filtering problem to disentangle a persistent component from a transitory component. The learning mechanism is treated as external to the model, implying that the model needs to be solved in every period in order to reflect the change in agents' beliefs regarding the two components. Consequently, when agents form their beliefs, they do not take into account how their beliefs will change. Furthermore, the method developed in Schorfheide (2005) cannot be immediately extended to models in which agents learn about changes in the stochastic properties of the model's structural parameters. Eusepi and Preston (2010) study monetary policy communication in a model where agents face uncertainty about the value of model parameters. Cogley, Matthes, and Sbordone (2011) address the problem of a newly appointed central bank governor who wants to disinflate. Unlike in the last two papers, in our paper, regime changes are recurrent, agents learn about the regime in place as opposed to Taylor rule parameters, we do not assume anticipated utility, and we conduct likelihood-based estimation.
Our paper also shows that when discrete regime changes are combined with a learning mechanism, a smooth evolution of expectations and uncertainty arises. Therefore, we implicitly connect the literature on discrete regime changes to the literature that models parameter instability as slowmoving processes. 3 Our work is also linked to papers that study the transmission of nominal disturbances in general equilibrium models with information frictions, such as Gorodnichenko (2008) , Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) , Mankiw and Reis (2006) , Melosi (2014 , 2017 ), and Nimark (2008 . Finally, this paper is connected with the literature that studies the macroeconomic effects of forward guidance (Del Negro, Giannoni, & Patterson 2012; Campbell et al., 2017) . The key innovation of our paper is that forward guidance is about the central bank's reaction function, whereas in that literature, communication is about future deviations from the monetary policy rule. This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce the baseline model. In section III, we show how to solve the model under the assumption of no transparency and transparency. In section IV, the model under the assumption of no transparency is fitted to U.S. data. In section V, we assess the welfare implications of introducing transparency. In section VI, we extend the analysis to imperfectly credible announcements. In section VII, we assess the robustness of our results. Section VIII concludes.
II. The Model
The model is built on Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) , who develop a prototypical New Keynesian DSGE model with trend inflation and partial price indexation. We make two main departures from this standard framework. First, we assume that households and firms have incomplete information, in a sense to be made clear shortly. Second, we assume parameter instability in the monetary policy rule. The representative household maximizes
where C t is composite consumption and N it is labor worked in industry i. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, the parameter ψ ≥ 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and E ·|F t is the expectation operator conditioned on information of private agents available at time t. The information set F t contains the history of all model variables but not the history of policy regimes ξ p t that, as we shall show, determines the parameter value of the central bank's reaction function. The flow budget constraint of the representative household in period t reads
where B t is the stock of one-period government bonds in period t, R t is the gross nominal interest rate, P t is the price of the final good, W it is the nominal wage earned from labor in industry i, T t is real transfers, and Div t are profits from ownership of firms. In every period t, the representative household chooses a consumption vector, labor supply, and bond holdings subject to the sequence of the flow budget constraints and a no-Ponzi-scheme condition. The representative household takes as given the nominal interest rate, the nominal wages, nominal aggregate profits, nominal lump-sum taxes, and the prices of all consumption goods.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms of mass one. Firms are indexed by i. Firm i supplies a differentiated good i. Firms face Calvo-type nominal rigidities, and the probability of reoptimizing prices in any given period is given by 1 − θ independent across firms. We allow for partial price indexation to steady-state inflation by firms that do not reoptimize their prices, with the parameter ω ∈ (0, 1) capturing the degree of indexation. Those firms that are allowed to reoptimize their price choose their price P * it so as to maximize
where Q t,t+k is the stochastic discount factor measuring the time t utility of one unit of consumption good available at time t + k,Π is the gross steady-state inflation rate, N it is amount of labor hired, and Y it is the amount of differentiated good produced by firm i. Firms are endowed with an identical technology of production:
The variable Z t captures exogenous shifts of the marginal costs of production and is assumed to follow a stationary first-order autoregressive process in log difference:
We refer to the innovations η zt as technology shocks. Firms face a downward-sloping demand function in every period, Y it = (P it /P t ) −ε Y t , where P it denotes the price firm i sells its good at time t. Aggregate labor input is defined
There are a monetary authority and a fiscal authority. Government consumption is defined as G t = (1 − 1/g t ) Y t , with the variable g t following a stationary first-order autoregressive process:
, where η gt is an i.i.d. government expenditure shock. The fiscal authority always follows a Ricardian fiscal policy and collects a lump-sum tax. The aggregate resource constraint reads Y t = C t +G t . The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate R t according to the Taylor
, where Π t = P t /P t−1 denotes the gross inflation rate and Y t is aggregate output in period t. The variable η rt captures nonsystematic exogenous deviations of the nominal interest rate R t from the rule. The variable ξ p t controls the policy regime that determines the policy coefficients of the rule reflecting the emphasis of the central bank on inflation stabilization relative to output gap stabilization.
We model changes in the central bank's emphasis on inflation and output stabilization by introducing a three-regime Markov-switching process ξ p t that evolves according to this matrix:
The realized regime determines the monetary policy parameters of the central bank's reaction function. In symbols,
Under regime 1 (the active regime), the central bank's main emphasis is on stabilizing inflation and the Taylor principle is satisfied:
Under regime 2 (the short-lasting passive regime), the central bank deemphasizes inflation stabilization, but only for short periods of time (on average). The same parameter combination also characterizes regime 3 (the long-lasting passive regime). Therefore, φ π ξ
However, under regime 3, deviations are generally more prolonged. In other words, regime 2 is less persistent than regime 3: p 22 < p 33 . Therefore, the two passive regimes do not differ in terms of response to inflation φ P π and the output gap φ P y , but only in terms of their relative persistence.
The three policy regimes are meant to capture the recurrent changes in the Federal Reserve's attitude toward inflation and output stabilization in the postwar period. A number of empirical works (Lubik & Schorfheide, 2004 ) have documented that the Federal Reserve deemphasized inflation stabilization for prolonged periods of time in the 1970s. Furthermore, as Bernanke (2003) argued, while the Federal Reserve has been mostly focused on actively stabilizing inflation starting from the early 1980s, it has also occasionally engaged in short-lasting policies whose objective was not to stabilize inflation in the short run. This monetary policy approach has been dubbed constrained discretion. We introduce this three-regime structure so as to give the model enough flexibility to explain both the long-lasting passive monetary policy of the 1970s and the recurrent and short-lasting passive policies of the post1970s.
The probabilities p 11 , p 12 , p 22 govern the evolution of monetary policy when the central bank follows constrained discretion. The larger p 12 is vis-à-vis p 11 , the more frequent the short-lasting deviations are. The larger p 22 is, the more persistent the short-lasting deviations are. The probability p 13 controls how likely it is that constrained discretion is abandoned in favor of a prolonged deviation from the active regime. The ratio p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) captures the relative probability of a short-lasting deviation conditional on having deviated to passive regimes and can be interpreted as a measure of central bank's long-run reputation. This is because this composite parameter controls how likely it is that the central bank will abandon constrained discretion the moment it starts deviating from the active regime. As will become clear, the central bank's long-run reputation has deep implications for the general equilibrium properties of the macroeconomy. This is because agents are fully rational and form expectations while taking into account the possibility of regime changes, implying that their beliefs matter for the way shocks propagate through the economy. Therefore, the proposed definition of central bank reputation has the important advantage of being measurable in the data, even over a relatively short period of time.
A. Communication Strategies
It can be shown that regime changes do not affect the steady-state equilibrium, only the way the economy propagates around it. Since technology Z t follows a random walk, we normalize all the nonstationary real variable by the level of technology. We then log-linearize the model around the steady-state equilibrium in which the steady-state inflation does not have to be 0. Once log-linearized, the imperfect information model can be solved under different assumptions on what the central bank communicates about the future monetary policy course: no transparency and transparency. 4 The central bank's communication affects agents' information set F t . We consider two cases: no transparency and transparency.
If the central bank is not transparent, it never announces the duration of passive policies. We call this approach no transparency. We make a minimal departure from the assumption of perfect information by assuming that agents can observe the history of all the endogenous variables and the history of the structural shocks but not the policy regimes ξ p t . It should be noted that agents are always able to infer if monetary policy is currently active or passive. However, when monetary policy is passive, agents cannot immediately figure out whether (short-lasting) regime 2 or (long-lasting) regime 3 is in place. To see why, recall that the two passive regimes are observationally equivalent to agents, given that φ p π and φ p y are the same across the two regimes. Therefore, agents conduct Bayesian learning in order to infer which one of the two regimes is in place. In the next section, we discuss how agents' beliefs evolve as agents observe more and more deviations from the active regime.
Under transparency, all the information held by the central bank is communicated to agents. We assume that the central bank knows how long it will be deviating from active monetary policy when conducting short-lasting deviations. Long-lasting deviations are intended to capture structural changes in the way monetary policy is conducted (e.g., the type of a newly appointed central banker). Therefore, their duration is always unknown to the central bank and, hence, cannot be announced. Notice that if a transparent central bank starts deviating from active policy without announcing the duration of such a passive policy, rational agents immediately infer that this deviation is a long-lasting one. 5 A transparent central bank announces the duration of shortlasting passive policies, revealing to agents exactly when monetary policy will switch back to the active regime. Agents form their beliefs by taking into account that the central bank will systematically announce the duration of every short-lasting passive policy.
We assume that the central bank's announcements are truthful and are believed as such by rational agents. In section VI, we consider the case in which the announcements made by the central bank are not always truthful. In section VII, we study the case in which the central bank can only announce the likely duration of passive policies-that is, the type of passive regime.
III. Beliefs Dynamics and Model Solution
To solve the model under no transparency, we use the methods developed in Bianchi and Melosi (2016) . Denote the number of consecutive deviations from the active regime at time t as τ t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, where τ t = 0 means that monetary policy is active at time t. Conditional on having observed τ t ≥ 1 consecutive deviations from the active regime at time t, agents believe that the central bank will keep deviating in the next period, t + 1, with probability
Equation (2) makes it clear that τ t is a sufficient statistic for the probability of being in the passive regime next period. This equation captures the dynamics of agents' beliefs about observing yet another period of passive policy in the next period, the key state variable we use to solve the model under no transparency. It should be also observed that equation (2) has a number of properties that are quite insightful to the key mechanism of the model at hand. The probability of observing yet another period of passive policy in the next period is a weighted average of the probabilities p 22 and p 33 , with weights that vary with the number of consecutive periods of passive policy τ t . When agents observe the central bank deviating from the active regime for the first time (τ t = 1), the weights for the probabilities p 22 and p 33 are p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) and p 13 / (1 − p 11 ), respectively. These weights reflect the central bank's long-run reputation. When its long-run reputation is high, it is very unlikely that the central bank engages in a long-lasting passive policy. Therefore, as the first period of passive policy is observed, agents are confident that the economy has entered the short-lasting passive regime (regime 2). If the central bank keeps deviating from the active regime, agents will eventually become convinced of being in the long-lasting passive regime (regime 3). After a sufficiently long-lasting passive policy, the probability of observing an additional deviation in the next period degenerates to the persistence of the long-lasting passive regime (regime 3). Hence, p 33 is the upper bound for the probability that agents attach to staying in the passive regime next period. It follows that for any e > 0, there exists an integer τ * such that p 33 − prob {τ t+1 = 0|τ t = τ * } < e. Therefore, for any τ t > τ * , agents' beliefs can be effectively approximated using the properties of the long-lasting passive regime.
Endowed with these results, we can solve the model under no transparency by expanding the number of regimes in order to take into account the evolution of agents' beliefs. Now each regime is characterized by the central bank's behavior and the number of observed consecutive deviations from active policy at any time t, τ t . The transition matrix for this new set of regimes indexed by τ t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ * } can be derived by equation (2), as shown in the online appendix. Now regimes are defined in terms of the observed consecutive durations, τ t , which, unlike the primitive set of policy regime ξ p t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, belong to the agents' information set F t . Hence, we can solve this model by applying any of the methods developed to solve Markov-switching rational expectations models with perfect information, such as Davig and Leeper (2007) , Farmer, Waggoner, and Foerster et al. (2016) . We use Farmer et al. (2011) .
It is worth emphasizing that this way of recasting the learning process allows us to tractably model the behavior of agents who know that they do not know. In other words, agents are aware that their beliefs will change in the future according to what they observe in the economy. This represents a substantial difference from the anticipated utility approach, in which agents form expectations without taking into account that their beliefs about the economy will change over time. Furthermore, our approach differs from the one traditionally used in the learning literature in which agents form expectations according to a reduced-form law of motion that is updated recursively (e.g., using discounted least squares regressions). The advantage of adaptive learning is the extreme flexibility given that, at least in principle, no restrictions need to be imposed on the type of parameter instability characterizing the model. However, such flexibility does not come without a cost, given that agents are not really aware of the model they live in.
When the central bank is transparent, the exact duration of every short-lasting deviation from active policy is truthfully announced. In this model, the number of announced shortlasting deviations from active policy yet to be carried out τ a t is a sufficient statistic that captures the dynamics of beliefs after an announcement. Since the exact duration of long-lasting passive policies is not announced, we also have to keep the long-lasting passive regime as one of the possible regimes. Regimes are ordered from the smallest number of announced deviations (zero or the active policy) to the largest one (τ a * ). The long-lasting passive regime, whose conditional persistence is p 33 , is ordered as the last regime. The evolution of the regimes is controlled by the transition matrix P A . The online appendix explains how to build such a transition matrix. As in the case of no transparency, we recast the MS-DSGE model under transparency as a Markov-switching rational expectations model with perfect information, in which the short-lasting passive regime is redefined in terms of the number of announced deviations from the active regimes yet to be carried out, τ a t . This redefined set of regimes belongs to the agents' information set F t under transparency. This result allows us to solve the model under transparency by applying any of the methods developed to solve Markov-switching rational expectations models of perfect information.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In order to put discipline on the parameter values, the model under no transparency is fitted to U.S. data. We believe that the model with a nontransparent central bank is better suited to capture the Federal Reserve communication strategy in our sample that ranges from the mid-1950s to just For observables, we use three series of U.S. quarterly data: the annualized gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, the annualized quarterly inflation (GDP deflator), and the federal funds rate (FFR). The sample spans from 1954:Q4 through 2009:Q3. Table 1 reports the prior and the posterior distribution of model parameters. The model is estimated by using a Gibbs sampling algorithm in which both the regime sequence and the model parameters are sampled. The algorithm is similar to the one used in Bianchi (2013) . Convergence is checked by using the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin potential reduction scale factor. The five chains consist of 270, 000 draws each and 1 of every 1, 000 draws is saved.
The parameter values are quite standard, with the central bank responding fairly aggressively to inflation when monetary policy is active. The central bank is also responding more aggressively to output under active policy. The response of the FFR to inflation in the passive regimes is estimated to be around 1.33, with 90% error bands spanning the interval between 1.04 and 1.60. This implies that many draws for the passive regime are well above 1, the threshold generally associated with the Taylor principle and active monetary policy. However, in a model like the one considered in this paper, the threshold for determinacy is affected by the absence of full indexation to trend inflation, as Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) pointed out. Once the determinacy region is properly adjusted, around 5% of the draws associated with the passive monetary policy rule falls in fact into the passive region and 30% of them are within 0.25 from the passive region. We still refer to this rule as passive to the extent that inflation stabilization is deemphasized. Furthermore, other studies that use richer models instead of the prototypical fixedparameter three-equation New Keynesian model also find a sizable probability that the response of monetary policy to inflation was not violating the Taylor principle in the 1970s (see, e.g., Bianchi, 2013, and Doh, 2014) .
The posterior median of the elasticity of substitution ε implies a net markup equal to approximately 13%. The Calvo parameter θ implies a fairly large degree of nominal rigidities, as is common when small-scale models are estimated. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is close to 1. The probability of being in the short-lasting passive regime conditional on having switched to passive policies, p 12 / (1 − p 11 ), plays a critical role in the model. As noted in section II, this parameter value relates to the strength of the Federal Reserve's long-run reputation. This parameter is found to be fairly close to 1, confirming that the Federal Reserve has a strong reputation. This number means that as agents observe a deviation from the active regime, they expect that the Federal Reserve is conducting a short-lasting passive policy with a probability of 95.36%.
Recall that in the estimated model, regimes are indexed with respect to the number of consecutive periods of passive policy, τ t . We have τ * + 1 regimes, where τ * depends on the speed of learning and can be larger than 100. Reporting the regime probabilities for such a large number of regimes is not practical. A most effective approach is to report the estimated expected number of consecutive deviations from active policy over the sample. As explained already, the higher the number of expected consecutive deviations, the larger is the posterior probability mass associated with the long-lasting passive regime. Furthermore, this statistic reflects agents' beliefs, and it is therefore critical to understand the effects of central bank communication on social welfare, as we will show later. The shaded areas in the upper panel of figure 1 show the periods of passive monetary policy based on the regime sequence associated with the posterior mode. The solid line reports the corresponding expected number of consecutive deviations from the active regime. This can be considered a measure of agents' pessimism because, as we show later in the paper, a larger number of expected consecutive deviations determines an increase in uncertainty and, as a result, a decline in agents' welfare. The figure highlights that shortlasting deviations from active policy imply only a modest increase in this statistic. In contrast, at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of expected consecutive deviations approaches its highest value, (1 − p 33 ) −1 , reflecting the fact that most of the posterior probability is shifted toward regimes associated with passive policies of fairly long duration. The expected duration of passive policy grows gradually throughout the 1970s and reaches relatively high levels at the end of this decade. This suggests that agents slowly changed their expectations about future policy as they observed more and more periods of passive policy in the 1970s. After the 1970s, a large posterior probability is attributed to either the active regime or passive policies of very short realized duration. This is captured by the number of expected deviations from active policy being either close to 0, when the active regime prevails, or else slightly positive, but below 10 quarters (i.e., 2 years and a half ) when short-lasting deviations occur during the 2001 recession and in correspondence with the most recent recession. This is the essence of constrained discretion we study in this paper.
Finally, we want to evaluate whether there is empirical support for our benchmark model with no transparency. To this end, we estimate an alternative model in which parameters are not allowed to change and then compare the two models by using a Bayesian model comparison. We find that the data strongly favor the Markov-switching specification, despite the larger number of parameters. In fact, the model with fixed parameters can attain a higher posterior probability only if one attaches extremely low prior probabilities (< 1.39E − 11) to this model.
A. Communication and Beliefs Dynamics
Regime changes in monetary policy and communication strategies critically affect social welfare and the macroeconomic equilibrium by influencing agents' pessimism about future monetary policy. In this paper, we use the word pessimism to precisely mean agents' expectations about the duration of an observed passive policy. A high level of pessimism means that agents expect an observed passive policy to last for fairly long-that is, close to the expected duration of the long-lasting passive regime: (1 − p 33 ) −1 . While expecting a longer-lasting deviation from the active regime is not necessarily welfare decreasing, we will show that expecting a prolonged period of passive policy impairs social welfare in the estimated model.
We measure pessimism by computing the number of expected consecutive periods of passive monetary policy conditional on the observed duration of passive policy τ ≥ 0.
The evolution of this variable is tightly linked to the estimated transition matrix, which in turn captures the central bank's long-run reputation. Let us consider the case in which the central bank decides to engage in passive policies lasting fifty consecutive periods. While such a long deviation from the active regime is not so likely, this example illustrates how transparency affects pessimism relative to no transparency. The lower panels of figure 1 report the evolution of pessimism under no transparency (left graph) and transparency (right graph) at the posterior mode. The two horizontal lines mark the smallest lower bound and upper bound for pessimism. The former is given by the expected duration of the short-lasting passive regime (1 − p 22 ) −1 . The smallest lower bound is attained at the first period of passive policy only if the conditional probability of a short-lasting deviation is one: p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) = 1. The left graph shows that the intercept of the solid line is quite close to the bottom dashed line, implying that agents expect that the Federal Reserve is engaging in a short-lasting deviation as the first period of passive policy is observed. This result is due to the fact that the Federal Reserve's reputation is estimated to be fairly high ( p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) = 0.9536).
The upper bound for pessimism is given by the expected duration of the long-lasting passive policy (1 − p 33 ) −1 and is attained only after a very large number of consecutive deviations from the active regime. Such a gradual increase in pessimism suggests that the Federal Reserve can enjoy a great deal of leeway in deviating from active monetary policy in order to stabilize alternative short-lasting objectives. This result is again due to the strong reputation of the Federal Reserve. If the reputation coefficient p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) were close to 0, then the expected number of consecutive deviations would experience a larger jump and, hence, the convergence to the upper bound would be faster.
As shown in the right graph, pessimism follows an inverse path under transparency. Unlike the case of no transparency, agents' pessimism is very high at the initial stages of the deviation from active policy, but it decreases as time goes by. This result comes from assuming that agents are fully rational and the announcement is truthful. As the 50 periods of passive monetary policy are announced (t = 0), an immediate rise in pessimism occurs. As the number of periods of passive policy yet to be carried out decreases, agents' pessimism declines accordingly. At the end of the policy (t = 50), pessimism reaches its lowest level, with agents expecting to return to the active regime with a probability of 1 in the following period. It should be noted that at the end of the announced deviation, transparency allows the central bank to lower agents' pessimism below the smallest lower bound attainable under no transparency: This result emerges because the central bank is able to inform agents about the exact period in which passive policy will be terminated. This assumption will be relaxed in section VII.
To sum up, the lower panels of figure 1 allow us to isolate two important effects of transparency on agents' pessimism about future monetary policy: (a) transparency raises pessimism at the beginning of the policy and (b) transparency anchors down pessimism at the end of the policy. As we shall show, these two effects play a critical role for the welfare implications of transparency.
V. Welfare Implications of Transparency
In this section, we assess the welfare implications of introducing transparency. Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that the regime changes considered in this paper do not affect the steady state, only the way the economy fluctuates around the steady state. The period welfare function can then be obtained by taking a log-quadratic approximation of the representative household's utility function around the deterministic steady state:
where var i (·) with i ∈ {T , N} stands for the stochastic variance associated with agents' forecasts of inflation conditional on transparency (T ) or no transparency (N) and the output gap at horizon h. The coefficients Θ i , i ∈ {0, 1, 2} are functions of the model's parameters and are defined in the online appendix. The subscript i refers to the communication strategy: i = N stands for the case of no transparency, and i = T denotes transparency. Finally, s t (i) denotes the policy regime:
The term Θ 0 captures the steady-state effects from positive trend inflation. These effects stem from positive trend inflation raising cross-sectional steady-state dispersion in prices that in turn lead to inefficient allocations of resources across industries (Coibion et al., 2012) . These steady-state effects are eliminated if price indexation is perfect (ω = 1). The term Θ 1 is directly related to the increasing disutility of labor supply. Since households' costs of supplying labor are convex, the expected disutility from labor rises with the volatility of output around its steady state. As Coibion et al. (2012) discussed, the magnitude of this coefficient is invariant to the level of trend inflationΠ. The term Θ 2 captures the effects of price dispersion on social welfare. Positive trend inflation generates some price dispersion. The increased price dispersion following an inflationary shock now becomes more costly because of the higher initial price dispersion due to positive trend inflation. Higher nominal rigidities (θ) lead to stronger effects of price dispersion on welfare (Θ 2 ). It should be noted that zero trend inflation (Π = 1) or positive trend inflation with perfect indexation (ω = 1) would imply that the steady-state costs of positive trend inflation go to 0 (Θ 0 = 0). A detailed derivation of the welfare function can be found in Coibion et al. (2012) . These welfare 6 s t (i = T ) = τ a * +1 denotes the long-lasting passive regime, whose exact realized duration is not announced. coefficients Θ 0 , Θ 1 , and Θ 2 depend on the governmentpurchase-to-output ratio in steady state, which we assume to be equal to 22%.
It can be shown that conditional on a price markup shock, the active regime is associated with a lower volatility of inflation but a higher volatility of the output gap compared with deviating to passive policies. This result captures the monetary policy trade-off due to these inefficient shocks, a well-known feature in the context of linear DSGE models. However, conditional on the other three shocks (i.e., the discount factor shock η g,t , the technology shock η zt , and the monetary shock η rt ), active policy always leads to a lower level of both volatilities and, hence, an unambiguously higher welfare.
Equation (3) makes explicit that social welfare depends on agents' uncertainty about future inflation and future output gaps. It should be noted that agents' uncertainty in any given period captures the macroeconomic risk associated with the observed policy regime and communication strategy, s t (i). Unlike standard New Keynesian models with fixed parameters, where welfare is merely a function of the unconditional variance of inflation and the output gap, our model allows us to study the dynamic effects of policy actions and forward-looking communication on welfare. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies this feature using a structural model. Furthermore, the learning mechanism plays an important role in our welfare analysis by linking the concept of a central bank's long-run reputation to a central bank's ability to control the dynamics of the macroeconomic risk associated with policy actions. This last point is the focus of the next session.
To assess the desirability of transparency, we compute the model-predicted welfare gains and losses from transparency as follows:
where p * T (τ a ) stands for the vector of ergodic probabilities of a passive policy of announced duration τ a and p * N (τ) stands for the vector of ergodic probabilities of a passive policy of observed duration τ. It is important to emphasize that welfare gains from transparency are not conditioned on a particular shock or policy path. Instead, the welfare gain is measured by the unconditional long-run change in welfare that arises if the central bank systematically announces the duration of any short-lasting deviation from active monetary policy.
Uncertainty about future output gaps turns out to play only a minor role for social welfare, since the estimated value of the slope of the Phillips curve is very small and the elasticity of substitution among goods ε is quite large. Such a flat Phillips curve is a standard finding when DSGE models are estimated using U.S. data and the estimated value of the elasticity of substitution is in line with the results of previous studies and with microdata on U.S. firms' average profitability. The estimated value of these two parameters causes the estimated coefficient for the inflation risk in the welfare function (Θ 2 ) to be bigger than the other two coefficients (Θ 0 and Θ 1 ) by several orders of magnitude. Therefore, welfare turns out to be tightly related to agents' uncertainty about future inflation, which, as we shall show, depends on the timevarying level of pessimism about observing a future switch to active monetary policy. For brevity, in what follows, we do not discuss the evolution of uncertainty about output gaps.
A. Evolution of Uncertainty
We have shown that agents' uncertainty about future inflation crucially affects social welfare in the estimated model. In this section, we show how uncertainty is tightly linked to agents' pessimism about observing active monetary policy in the future. As shown in section IVA, transparency has two effects on pessimism: (a) pessimism rises at the beginning of the policy (henceforth, the short-run effect of transparency on pessimism) and (b) pessimism is anchored down at the end of the policy (henceforth, the anchoring effect of transparency on pessimism). As we shall show, these two effects play a critical role for the welfare implications of enhancing a central bank's transparency.
To illustrate how uncertainty responds to pessimism under the two communication strategies, we consider the case in which the Federal Reserve conducts a forty-quarter-long deviation from active monetary policy. 7 While such a longlasting realization of the short-lasting regime is implausible, this example allows us to highlight the key implications of the two communication strategies on welfare. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of uncertainty about inflation at different horizons h under no transparency (left panel) and under transparency (right panel). At each point in time, the evolution of agents' uncertainty is measured by the h-period-ahead standard deviation of inflation given the communication strategy-that is, sd i (π t+h |τ t ) = 100
, where i ∈ {N, T } captures the communication strategy. We analytically compute the conditional standard deviations taking into account regime uncertainty by using the methods described in Bianchi (2016) . As shown in the upper left graph, when the central bank does not announce its policy course beforehand, uncertainty about future inflation is fairly low at the beginning of the policy because agents interpret the first deviations from active policy as short-lasting. As more and more periods of passive policy are observed, agents become progressively more convinced that the observed deviation may have a long-lasting nature, and uncertainty about future inflation gradually takes off. Uncertainty rises because expecting a longer spell of passive policies raises concerns about the central bank's ability to control the inflationary consequences of future shocks. Note that the increase in uncertainty occurs at every horizon because agents expect passive monetary policy to prevail for many periods ahead. It is worth emphasizing that the pattern of agents' uncertainty over time mimics the evolution of pessimism depicted in the lower panels of figure 1. Since higher uncertainty leads to bigger welfare losses, the progressive disanchoring of uncertainty about future inflation is of concern for a nontransparent central bank.
The lower left panel shows the dynamics of uncertainty across different horizons when ten, twenty, and forty quarters of deviations are observed under no transparency. The gray area captures the dynamics of uncertainty across horizons in the case of perfect information-that is, the case in which agents know whether the passive regime in place is short-or long-lasting. Thus, the lower-(upper-) bound of the gray area captures the uncertainty when agents know for certain that the short-(long-) lasting passive regime is in place. After forty consecutive deviations from active policy have been observed, uncertainty evolves as if agents knew with certainty that the central bank is conducting a longlasting policy (the black dashed-dotted line). After observing so many deviations, agents are certain that this is a longlasting passive policy and cannot become more uncertain about future inflation. Therefore, the dynamics of uncertainty when agents perfectly know that the nature of passive policy is long-lasting represents an upper bound for agents' uncertainty.
The dynamics of uncertainty conditional on a short-lasting passive policy under perfect information constitute a lower bound for uncertainty under no transparency. Once the central bank starts deviating, the higher the central bank's long-run reputation p 12 / (1 − p 11 ) is, the closer the dynamics of uncertainty to this lower bound are. The lower left graph shows that the evolution of uncertainty remains close to the lower bound even after ten consecutive periods of passive policy. This result reflects the high reputation of the Federal Reserve.
The right upper graph of figure 2 shows the dynamics of uncertainty about future inflation in the case of transparency. Comparing the upper graphs (the scale of the z-axes are identical) illustrates that uncertainty is higher under transparency at the beginning of a forty-period-long passive policy. This is captured by the pronounced hump-shaped dynamics of short-and medium-horizon uncertainty. This result is driven by the short-run effect of transparency on pessimism. The announcement commits the central bank to follow a passive policy for the next forty periods, causing agents to expect larger consequences from the shocks that will materialize during the implementation of the announced policy path. The lower right graph compares the dynamics of uncertainty after announcing the passive policy of increasing durations (ten, twenty, and forty quarters) with the upper and lower bounds for the case of no transparency (the gray area). After announcing forty quarters of passive policy, uncertainty is above the gray area at short and medium horizons, implying that uncertainty becomes higher than the upper bound for the case of no transparency. This overreaction of short-run uncertainty is driven by the short-run effect of transparency on pessimism and contributes to lowering the welfare gains from transparency.
Compared with uncertainty in the case of no transparency, uncertainty in the case of transparency is larger at the beginning of the policy at both short and medium horizons. However, forty-quarter-ahead inflation uncertainty appears to be smaller in the case of transparency. This result is due to the anchoring effect of transparency on pessimism. While agents know that monetary policy will be passive for forty quarters, they also take into account that there will be a switch to the active regime in forty quarters. Announcing the timing of the return to active monetary policy determines a fall in uncertainty in correspondence with the horizons that coincide with the announced date. In the upper right graph of figure 2, such a decline in uncertainty shows up as a valley in the surface representing the level of uncertainty. As we shall show, this feature of transparency has the effect of raising social welfare by systematically anchoring agents' uncertainty at the end of the announced deviations from the active regime. Furthermore, at long horizons, uncertainty is always lower under transparency. In fact, the lower right graph shows that in the case of transparency, longhorizon uncertainty is lower than the lower bound for the no-transparency case even when very persistent passive policies are announced. This result is due to the anchoring effect of transparency on pessimism and contributes to raising welfare gains from transparency.
To sum up, under no transparency, uncertainty increases across all horizons as the policy is implemented, while under transparency, uncertainty decreases over time because agents are aware that the end of the prolonged period of passive monetary policy is approaching. These opposite patterns for uncertainty under the two communication strategies are due to the anchoring effect of transparency on pessimism.
It should be noted that the evolution of uncertainty conditional on being in the active regime is not the same across the two alternative communication strategies. This is because transparency determines an overall reduction in uncertainty that manifests itself also under the active regime, even if under the active regime, no announcement is made. A transparent central bank enjoys lower uncertainty even when monetary policy is active because agents understand that should a short-lasting passive policy of any duration be implemented in the future, the central bank will announce its duration beforehand. As it will soon become clear, such a communication strategy is effective in reducing uncertainty by removing the fear of a long-lasting deviation for the frequent short-lasting deviations and creating an anchoring effect for the sporadic long-lasting deviations. Since the active regime occurs often, its weight for the welfare calculation in equation (4) is rather large, implying that welfare gains conditional on being in the active regime will critically affect the welfare-based ranking of the two alternative communication strategies.
B. Welfare Gains from Transparency
To assess the overall welfare gains from transparency, we use equation (4), which combines the welfare associated with the policy regimes (τ t for the case of no transparency and τ a t for the case of transparency) and their ergodic probabilities. 8 To facilitate the comparison, we redefine the regimes under transparency τ a t in terms of observed periods of passive policy τ t and recompute welfare in the case of transparency associated with these new set of regimes.
The line in figure 3 shows the welfare gains from transparency associated with having observed passive policies for τ t periods based on the posterior mode estimates. The bars report the ergodic probabilities of regimes τ t . Only short deviations from active policy are plausible for the United States. The line shows that for passive policies of plausible durations, transparency raises welfare, implying that the model-predicted welfare gains from transparency ΔW e in equation (4) are positive. Interestingly, the welfare gains from transparency for observed deviations τ t gradually decline as the number of observed deviations increases. This result stems from the fact that announcing longer and longer deviations progressively strengthens the short-run effect of transparency on pessimism. This in turn raises the risk of macroeconomic instability, as shown in figure 2.
We find that the gains from transparency are roughly 3.74% of steady-state consumption for the U.S. economy, with a 70% posterior credible interval covering the range 1.74% to 5.30%. This result implies that the anchoring effect of transparency dominates the short-run effects. In other words, transparency is welfare improving because it allows the central bank to effectively sweep away the fear of a return to the 1970s-type of passive policies. This explains why when the central bank conducts an active policy (τ t = 0), the The dynamics of inflation uncertainty resulting only from policy actions. The dynamics of uncertainty predicted by the two models is rescaled so that in 1968:Q4, inflation uncertainty is equal to the least square constant estimated using uncertainty in the data.
welfare gains from transparency are not 0. They are, in fact, positive, capturing the welfare gains from expecting that the central bank will systematically and truthfully announce the duration of any future short-lasting passive policy.
C. Inflation Uncertainty in the Data
One property of the estimated model is that beliefs change gradually as more and more periods of passive policy are observed. If we assume that for an alternative model, agents perfectly know the realization of policy regimes (perfect information), their beliefs would respond abruptly as the central bank changes its attitude toward inflation stabilization. In this section, we test the diverging predictions of these two models on the dynamics of inflation uncertainty in the 1970s, which both models identify as a period in which a long-lasting passive policy was implemented. 9 This test is intended to empirically validate the learning mechanism put forward in the paper. We focus on uncertainty about inflation because this variable is the key driver of social welfare in the estimated model. Figure 4 compares the dynamics of one-year-ahead inflation uncertainty measured by D'Amico and Orphanides (2014) from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, with the trend in the one-year-ahead inflation uncertainty predicted by the estimated Markov-switching model with learning (no transparency) and by the estimated Markov-switching model with perfect information. In the latter model, agents perfectly know which type of policy regime is in place. The model with perfect information predicts a sharp rise in inflation uncertainty as monetary policy switches to the long-lasting passive policy. After the switch to passive policy, the perfect information model predicts that long-run uncertainty stays put at this higher level throughout the 1970s. In contrast, the model with learning predicts a smaller rise in uncertainty as monetary policy becomes passive in the late 1960s 9 We focus on the 1970s because in periods of active or short-lasting passive policy, uncertainty behaves similar to the case of perfect information. and a gradual run-up in inflation uncertainty in the subsequent years. This gradual increase in uncertainty is due to the prolonged period of passive policy that caused agents to become progressively more convinced that this policy had a long-lasting nature. The data (the dotted line) suggest that inflation uncertainty grew slowly in the 1970s, favoring the dynamics predicted by the model with learning. Since uncertainty is not an observable in our estimation, the comparison in figure 4 constitutes an external validation exercise.
VI. Imperfectly Credible Announcements
In this section, we study the consequences of imperfectly credible announcements. Let us consider the case in which the central bank systematically announces the duration of short-lasting deviations, but it lies if the duration is longer than τ. To model this idea, we assume that the duration of passive policies τ is drawn accordingly with the Markovswitching process implied by the primitive matrix P, defined in section III. If the drawn duration of the passive policy τ is smaller than or equal to τ, the central bank announces τ a = τ. If the drawn duration of the passive policy τ is larger than τ, the central bank lies and announces a number of consecutive deviations τ a between 1 andτ. Note that the central bank's lie is discovered after τ a + 1 periods, and at this point, rational agents know that the policy will stay passive for sure until τ ≥ τ a . For any period of the short-lasting passive policy observed after τ, agents have to learn the persistence of the regime in place as they do in the no-transparency case.
We also assume that if the central bank lies, it is more likely to announce a fairly large number of deviations in order to deceive for longer. This property also implies that the longer the announced deviation, the more likely it is that the central bank has lied and will keep deviating from active policy at the end of the announced passive policy. Thus, the probability of returning to an active policy declines as the horizon of the announced policy increases. The central bank does not announce long-lasting deviations, which is consistent with how we have defined transparency throughout this paper.
A detailed description of how to specify the transition matrix for the regimes in the case of imperfectly credible announcements is provided in the online appendix. In what follows, we assume that the central bank always lies if the number of deviations is larger thanτ = 4. We then assume a mapping f (τ a ) to control the probability that the central bank announces τ a periods of passive policy conditional on having lied (τ >τ): f (τ a ) = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} for τ a = {1, 2, 3, 4}, respectively. This mapping implies that if the central bank lies, it is four times more likely that a four-quarter deviation from active policy is announced relative to a one-quarter deviation. This last assumption causes the probability of returning to an active policy to decline as the horizon of the announced policy increases. It turns out that this specification does not substantially change the main results of the paper. Even if the central bank can lie, transparency is still welfare improving. In fact, limiting the number of periods of passive policy the central bank truthfully announces leads to a slight increase in the welfare gains from transparency. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of welfare as a 20-period passive policy is implemented under three different announcements. 10 In all cases, the announcements are made by the central bank at the beginning of the period of passive policy. The solid line corresponds to the benchmark model and captures the dynamics of welfare in the case in which the central bank truthfully announces the duration of the passive policy. The dot-dashed line and the solid line with circles capture the dynamics of welfare in the case in which the central bank announces that the passive policy will last one quarter and four quarters, respectively. This plot illustrates that lying about the duration of passive policies raises welfare in the short run. These gains stem from preventing the sudden rise in pessimism that occurs at the beginning of an announced passive policy. Nevertheless, lying eventually backfires. Once agents realize that the announcement was in fact a lie, welfare experiences a discrete drop. After that, it starts following a pattern similar to the one prevailing under no transparency. Of course, relaxing the assumption that announcements are fully credible has also a third effect on the welfare gains from transparency. This has to do with the fact that agents question the veracity of central bank's announcements even when the central bank is in fact telling the truth. This effect contributes to lowering the welfare gains from transparency. For the United States, the positive short-run effects on the welfare gains from transparency dominate the other two negative effects. Consequently, our results suggest that even if the central bank is unable to make perfectly credible announcements, transparency still determines an increase in welfare, and this gain might be even larger than under perfectly credible announcements.
VII. Robustness
We have shown that enhancing a central bank's transparency would raise welfare. The computation of expected welfare gains from transparency is obtained using the ergodic distribution of the policy regimes and, hence, captures the long-run gains. However, it remains to be seen if the central bank is better off following transparency for any possible duration of the short-lasting deviations. In other words, are there short-lasting deviations for which the central bank would rather be nontransparent? We find that the positive gains from transparency occur for every plausible duration of the passive policy. 11 This finding suggests that the central bank is better off by announcing passive policies of every plausible duration.
We now relax the assumption that the central bank knows the exact duration of passive policies. Rather, we assume that the central bank knows only the expected duration of the deviations from the active regime-that is, the bank perfectly knows only if the passive policy is short-lasting or long-lasting. Thus, now under transparency, the central bank truthfully announces whether it will be conducting a short-lasting or a long-lasting passive policy. We find that under limited information, welfare gains from transparency are always positive for policies of any plausible duration. 12 Compared with the case in which the central bank announces the exact duration of the short-lasting passive policies, the magnitude of the welfare gains from transparency is smaller as the central bank knows less about the duration of the policy it is implementing. In fact, the model-predicted welfare gains from transparency amount to 0.54% of steady-state consumption. Thus, our analysis suggests that the welfare gains from transparency are positive and are quantified to range from 0.54% to 3.74% depending on how informed the central bank is regarding the duration of passive policies.
VIII. Conclusion
We have developed a general equilibrium model in which the central bank can deviate from active inflation stabilization. Agents observe when monetary policy becomes passive, but they face uncertainty regarding the nature of these deviations. Importantly, when observing passive policy, they cannot rule out the possibility of a return to the 1970s-type of passive policies. The longer the deviation from active policy is, the more pessimistic about the evolution of future monetary policy agents become. This implies that as the central bank keeps deviating, uncertainty increases and welfare deteriorates.
When the model is fitted to U.S. data, we find that the Federal Reserve benefits from a strong reputation. As a result, policymakers can deviate for a prolonged period of time from active monetary policy before losing control over agents' uncertainty about future inflation. Nevertheless, increasing transparency about the central bank's future behaviors would improve welfare by anchoring agents' pessimism following exceptionally prolonged periods of passive monetary policy and by removing the fear of a return to the 1970s following the frequent short-lasting deviations.
A limitation of the current analysis is that agents learn only the persistence of passive policies, while the active regime is fully revealing. This implies that agents' expectations are completely revised as soon as the central bank returns to the active regime. In Bianchi and Melosi (2016) , we develop a more general methodology that could be used to study a model in which agents have to learn about the likely duration of both passive and active policies. This extension would add further realism to the model because it would make the cost of losing reputation more persistent. While we regard the estimation of a model with richer learning dynamics as an important direction for future research, at this stage estimating a model of this type is computationally challenging. Furthermore, we believe that such an extension is unlikely to affect the main conclusions of this paper. This is because announcing the return to a long-lasting period of active monetary policy would still have the effect of anchoring agents' pessimism and uncertainty.
